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EMPLOYEE BENEFITS-EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT ALLOWS EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EQUITABLE RESTITUTION OF MISTAKEN
PENSION FUND CONTRIBUTIONS
Plucinski v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether an employer has a cause of action to recover
mistaken overpayments to a multiemployer-employee benefit plan is
currently hotly debated.' Circuit courts that have addressed the issue
remain split.2 Most circuits have addressed the issue in terms of
whether this cause of action can be implied from section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii)
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 3 Generally,
1. An employee benefit plan can be either an "employee pension benefit
plan" or an "employee welfare benefit plan," or both. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)
(1988). An "employee pension benefit plan" provides retirement income for
employees or defers their income until retirement. Id. § 1002(2)(A). An "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan" is "maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or bene-
fits, in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or va-
cation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services .... " Id. § 1002(1).
A multiemployer benefit plan is created by a collective bargaining agree-
ment between one or more employee organizations and at least two employees.
Note, Implying a Statutory Right for Employers for the Return of Mistaken Overcontribu-
tions to a Multiemployer-Employee Benefit Plan, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 396, 396-97
(1987). Employers contribute to the plans on behalf of their employees covered
by the collective bargaining agreement, Id. These contributions are often based
on the number of hours worked by the employee, the production of the em-
ployer, or both. Id. at 397 (citing Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 395
(11th Cir. 1986) (contributions based on tons of coal produced and hours
worked) and Service Employees Int'l Union Local 82 Labor-Management Trust
Fund v. Baucomjanitorial Serv., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 197, 198 (D.D.C. 1980) (con-
tribution based on total productive hours worked)). For ERISA's statutory defi-
nition of a multiemployer plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A) (1988).
2. The Eleventh, Ninth, Seventh and Sixth Circuits have addressed the is-
sue of whether an employer has a cause of action for the return of overpay-
ments. See infra notes 4-6. Other circuits, while not addressing the issue
directly, have allowed the employer to recover the mistaken overpayments on
equitable grounds. See Dumac Forestry Servs., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 814 F.2d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1987); Teamsters Local 639-Employers
Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1981) (equi-
table principles should apply to determine whether restitution of overpayment is
proper; factors such as set off for payments made to beneficiaries not actually
covered by plan and illegality of payments must be considered); Reuther v.
Trustees of Trucking Employees, 575 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (did
not address issue of implied right nor federal common law cause of action, but
applied equitable principles to allow recovery).
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
(799)
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while the Ninth Circuit has allowed such a cause of action, 4 most other
circuits have rejected such an implied cause of action.5 Some courts,
after rejecting an implied cause of action, have considered whether fed-
1461 (1988); see id. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (as amended by the Multiemployer Pen-
sion Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), Pub. L. No. 96-364, tit. 4,
§ 4 10(a), 94 Stat. 1308). Originally, ERISA provided that in "case of a contribu-
tion which is made by an employer by a mistake of fact, [section 403(c)(1)] shall
not prohibit the return of such contribution to the employer within one year
after the payment of the contribution." See Note, supra note 1, at 399 n.16. Con-
gress amended this section making the time limit for the return more lenient;
Congress also believed the requirement that a contribution be made by a mis-
take of fact was too narrow and amended the statute to allow return for a mis-
take of law as well. JOINT EXPLANATION OF S. 1076: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION
PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980, 126 CONG. REC. 20,208 (1980).
Incorporating these changes, sections 403(c)(1) and (2)(A) now provide:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) or subsection
(d) of this section, or under section 1342 and 1344 of this title (relating
to termination of insured plans), the assets of a plan shall never inure
to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive pur-
poses of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their benefi-
ciaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.
(2)(A) In the case of a contribution, or a payment of withdrawal
liability under part 1 of subtitle E of subchapter III of this chapter-
(i) made by an employer to a plan (other than a multiemployer
plan) by a mistake of fact, paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the re-
turn of such contribution to the employer within one year after the
payment of the contribution, and
(ii) made by an employer to a multiemployer plan by a mistake
of fact or law (other than a mistake relating to whether the plan is
described in section 401(a) of Title 26 or the trust which is part of
such plan is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of Title
26), paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of such contribu-
tion or payment to the employer within 6 months after the plan
administrator determines that the contribution was made by such a
mistake.
29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988).
Most circuits, in determining whether there is an implied cause of action
under section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), have applied the four factor analysis first outlined
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See, e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v.
Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 228-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986).
For a discussion of the Cort test and its application, see infra notes 35, 73-96 and
accompanying text.
4. Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066,
1068 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that cause of action for return of mistaken pay-
ments properly implied by section 403 under standards of Cort v. Ash); Chase v.
Trustees of Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 753 F.2d
744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). The Ninth Circuit has also implied other
causes of action under ERISA. See, e.g., Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National
Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer in-
jured by interruption of benefits to his employee has implied cause of action
under ERISA as long as employer alleges specific and personal injury).
5. Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989) (no implied cause
of action exists under section 403 because section 502 of ERISA provides exclu-
sive list of allowable parties and causes of action and does not include employ-
ers); Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399-400 (11th Cir. 1986) (no
implied cause of action under section 403 because of lack of legislative intent
2
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eral common law could support a cause of action for equitable restitu-
tion; these courts are also divided. 6
This conflict among the circuits seems to result from four main fac-
tors. First, the language of section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is ambiguous. 7 In-
stead of clearly creating a cause of action for the return of
overpayments, the section merely provides that the prohibition against
plan assets enuring to the benefit of the employer "shall not prohibit the
return of such [mistaken] contribution or payment to the employer
.... ,,8 A second factor is the disagreement over whether section 502 of
ERISA,9 which expressly grants the right to initiate a private cause of
required by Cort analysis); Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 228-29 (no implied cause
of action under Cort analysis).
6. After refusing to recognize an implied cause of action under section 403,
the Eleventh Circuit also rejected the existence of a federal common law cause
of action. See Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 399 n.7 ("Although the question is not well
presented . . .we hold that no federal common law right to recovery of the
disputed contributions at issue in this case exists.").
The Sixth Circuit, while rejecting an implied cause of action, has allowed an
employer a federal common law cause of action for equitable restitution of mis-
taken overpayments. See Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at 234-36 (preemption section
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1441 (a), and congressional directive authorizing courts to
develop federal common law concerning pension rights supports creation of
federal common law cause of action for mistaken overpayments); see also
Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 719 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1983) (allowing
federal common law cause of action for unjust enrichment to self-employed
union members who over-contributed; trustee must make determination which
is conclusive unless arbitrary or capricious, not supported by evidence or erro-
neous on question of law).
Some district courts have also rejected an implied cause of action and al-
lowed a federal common law cause of action. See Soft Drink Indus. Local Union
No. 744 Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. Supp. 743, 747-51
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding common law right of action but no implied right of
action); Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F.
Supp. 943, 950 (D. Del. 1985) (no implied cause of action but federal common
law cause of action exists; noting that result is consistent with courts that allow
implied cause of action), aff'd in relevant part, 850 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir. 1988)
(court did not consider whether implied or federal common law right exists be-
cause issue not raised on appeal).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). For the full text of this provision,
see supra note 3.
8. ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). For the
full text of this provision, see supra note 3.
The Ninth Circuit construed this language as creating a right in the em-
ployer to a return of the mistaken contributions. See Award Serv. Inc. v. North-
ern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Note,
supra note 1, at 408-09. Other circuits, however, stress that the language is
merely permissive and no such right exists. See, e.g., Whitworth Bros., 794 F.2d at
231.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988). ERISA section 502 provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this sec-
tion, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
3
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action to enforce specified ERISA provisions only to plan participants, ' 0
beneficiaries,"I fiduciaries,' 2 and the Secretary of Labor, is an exclusive
listing of civil causes of action and those who have standing to bring
them, thereby prohibiting employers from bringing a cause of action. 13
A third factor which increases the likelihood of conflict among the cir-
cuits is the lack of legislative history as to whether such a cause of action
does indeed exist. 14 Finally, the concern that allowing a cause of action
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appro-
priate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section,
by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equita-
ble relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of
this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection
(i) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988).
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is also limited in section 502. Section
502(e)(i) states that federal district courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
10. For the statutory definition of participant, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)
(1988).
11. For the statutory definition of a beneficiary, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)
(1988).
12. For the statutory definition of a fiduciary, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1988). In some limited circumstances an employer is regarded as a fiduciary
and can thus bring suit under section 502(a)(3). Note, supra note 1, at 400 n.26
(citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1103 (6th Cir. 1983)
(employer named administrator of single employer benefit plan and thus its fi-
duciary) and United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 669 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1982) (employer has sole authority to de-
termine and alter terms of employee health benefit plan)).
13. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 225-26
(6th Cir.) (outlining position of the various courts and stating "courts disagree
whether the grant ofjurisdiction in section 502 is exclusive, thereby prohibiting
an action by an employer .. "), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); see also Dime
Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11th Cir. 1986) (refusing to allow
federal common law cause of action because section 502 creates comprehensive
legislative scheme for enforcement, thereby resulting in presumption that such
remedy deliberately omitted).
14. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension
Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949 (D. Del. 1985) (noting lack of legislative intent to
create remedy), aff'd in relevant part, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
802 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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will damage the integrity of benefit plans has led to differing results.' 5
The Third Circuit directly considered the issue of whether an em-
ployer has an implied cause of action under either section 403 of ERISA
or a federal common law cause of action for equitable restitution to re-
cover mistaken overpayments for the first time in Plucinski v. I.A.M. Na-
tional Pension Fund. 16 In Plucinski, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that there is no implied right of action under ER-
ISA for recovery of payments made to a pension fund under mistake of
fact or law, but that there is an action available under federal common
law for equitable restitution.1 7
II. DIscussIoN
In Plucinski, Perth Amboy Dry Dock Co. (PADD) sought to recover
payments made on behalf of its employee, Plucinski,' 8 to the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Fund (IAM
Fund or the Fund). 19 Beginning in 1966, PADD entered into a series of
15. In Crown Cork & Seal v. Teamsters Pension Fund, this concern led the court
to completely reject any implied cause of action. 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Pa.
1982). In rejecting the implied cause of action, the court stated, "[t]o impose a
right of restitution in favor of employers could severely undermine the funds'
integrity." Id. In Award Service, Inc. v. Northern California Retail Clerks Unions, this
concern led the court to attach a caveat to the implied cause of action it found
under section 403: "Award Service [the employer] will have to establish that the
equities favor restitution in order to succeed on the merits." 763 F.2d 1066,
1069 (9th Cir. 1985).
16. 875 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit, while having dealt
with related issues, has never addressed the issue of whether an employer has an
implied cause of action or a federal common law cause of action to recover mis-
taken contributions. See Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pen-
sion Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (refusing to review lower court
holding that federal common law cause of action exists for employer to recover
mistaken overpayments because benefit fund did not cross-appeal finding); Van
Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 310-12 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding em-
ployees have no cause of action under federal common law unjust enrichment
theory to recover surplus funds where contract provides surplus is to go to em-
ployer even though section 4044(d)(2) of ERISA reflects Congress's view that
equities favor surplus going to beneficiaries where contract provides surplus is
to go to employer); Reuther v. Trustees of Trucking Employees, 575 F.2d 1074,
1078-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (allowing employer to recover mistaken overpayments
citing "equitable character" of pension plans without addressing existence of
federal common law or implied right).
17. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1053. The court emphasized that the employer
can recover the mistakenly paid funds only when the court finds it equitable to
do so. Id. The court then noted that equitable circumstances would require the
court to refrain from granting restitution where refunding the payments would
lead to the underfunding of the plan. Id.
18. Id. Pluncinski's employment with PADD as a storekeeper began in Oc-
tober 1945. Id.
19. The IAM Fund is a "defined benefit" fund which means that the fund
does not keep segregated accounts for individual employees; instead, all assets
are pooled and pensions are paid from this pool at a predetermined amount to
eligible employees upon retirement. Id. For a discussion of definitions of multi-
1990] 803
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collective bargaining agreements that obligated it to make contributions
to this fund on behalf of members of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) and three other local un-
ions.20 Both parties agreed that neither the original nor any subsequent
agreements between PADD and its employees covered Plucinski. 2 1
PADD contended that it began making contributions on Plucinski's be-
half only after it reached an agreement with a union representative al-
lowing Plucinski to participate in the IAM Fund.2 2 The IAM Fund,
however, disputed this and alleged that PADD began making payments
to defraud the Fund into accepting Plucinski although he was not enti-
tled to participate under the collective bargaining agreements. 23
In October 1984, shortly before he reached the age of sixty-five,
Plucinski filed an application for pension benefits with the IAM Fund. 24
The Fund denied the request. 25 Then on March 17, 1986, Plucinski
brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey against PADD, the IAM Fund and other defendants to recover the
value of the pension benefits that he was promised. 26 PADD cross-
claimed against the IAM Fund to recover the contributions on behalf of
Plucinski.2 7 On motion for summary judgment, the district court held
that PADD was solely responsible for paying Plucinski's pension and di-
rected the IAM Fund to refund to PADD the value of all contributions
paid on behalf of Plucinski, plus interest. 28
In so holding, the district court found that it was appropriate to
create a federal common law cause of action for the recovery of errone-
ously paid contributions. 29 The IAM Fund appealed the district court's
employer-employee benefit plans and the formalities required to create them,
see supra note 1.
20. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1053.
21. Id. Plucinski was neither a member of the IAM nor the three other local
unions covered by the agreement nor was his job classification of "storekeeper"
covered by any collective bargaining agreement. Id.
22. Id. at 1053-54. In March 1972, the IAM Fund advised PADD that it
would not permit participation by any more employees who were not members
of the IAM. Id. at 1053. PADD began making these payments on behalf of
Plucinski in late 1972 or early 1973. Id.
23. Id. at 1054.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Fund denied the request because, as a storekeeper, Plucinski
was not entitled to benefits under any of the collective bargaining agreements
and there was no other written agreement making Plucinski eligible. Id.
26. Id. The other defendants included the PADD Management Pension
Fund, PADD's former President, Alfred C. Bruggeman and PADD's Vice Presi-
dent, William T. Harth. Id. These defendants, however, were not involved in
the appeal. After the district court decision, Plucinski settled his claims with the
four defendants, PADD, the PADD Management Fund, Bruggeman and Harth.
Id.
27. Id. The IAM Fund also cross-claimed against PADD. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citation omitted). The Third Circuit noted that, in so holding, the
804 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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order that IAM refund to PADD all contributions made on behalf of
Plucinski. 30 Thus, the sole issue on appeal was whether PADD, as an
employer, had a valid cause of action to recover mistakenly paid
contributions. 3 1
In analyzing whether an employer has such a cause of action, the
Third Circuit first noted that the only section of ERISA which refers to
mistaken contributions is section 403.32 The Third Circuit recognized
that section 403 provides no express right of action for employers to
recover mistaken contributions. 33 Since no express cause of action ex-
isted, the court then addressed whether the district court's judgment
could be supported by either an implied right of action or a federal com-
mon law cause of action.3 4
In determining whether there was an implied right of action under
section 403, the court first discussed the four factor analysis outlined by
the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 3 5 noting, however, that
"[t]he question ... is one of statutory construction, and the key inquiry
is the intent of the legislature. ' 36 The court then noted that the circuits
are divided on the issue, the Ninth Circuit holding that employers have
an implied right of action for the recovery of mistaken contributions
under section 403, 37 and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits holding that no
district court adopted the holding and reasoning of Airco Industrial Gases v.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 1985),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). Plucinski, 875 F.2d at
1054.
30. Id. Originally, PADD also appealed but it thereafter settled with Plucin-
ski and withdrew its appeal. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1054-55. Section 403 is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988).
For the text of section 403, see supra note 3.
33. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1054. Instead, according to the court, section
403(c)(2)(A)(ii) merely makes it possible for the trustee to refund the mistaken
contributions without violating the non-enurement provisions of section
403(c)(1). Id. at 1055. For the complete text of section 403, see supra note 3.
34. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1055. The court addressed both issues even
though the district court's holding was based upon a federal common law cause
of action and PADD appeared to concede that there was no implied right of
action because recognizing a cause of action under either theory would allow the
court to affirm the district court's judgment. Id. (citingJurinko v. Edwin L. Wie-
gand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1045 (3d Cir. 1973)).
35. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Plucinski court summarized these factors:
(1) [W]hether the plaintiff is in the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any indication that Congress
intended to imply a remedy; (3) whether a remedy is consistent with the
purposes underlying the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause
of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.
Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1055 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
36. Id. (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of
America, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981)).
37. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1055 (citing Award Serv. Inc. v. Northern Cal.
Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1081 (1986)). The Plucinski court then summarized the Cort analysis in Award
1990]
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such implied right of action exists.3 8
In Plucinski, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach, and
adopted that of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits because the court found
that " 'neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a congres-
sional intent to create a private right of action.' ,,39 The court sup-
ported this finding of lack of intent with two reasons. 40 First, the
language of section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is permissive. Merely giving permis-
sion does not imply that Congress also intended employers to be able to
judicially compel the refund of contributions. 4 1 Second, the court noted
that there is no indication in the statute or in the legislative history that
Congress intended to provide employers any causes of action at all
under ERISA. 42 Section 50243 demonstrates this proposition through
its specification that participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries and the Secre-
Service, noting that the Ninth Circuit did not support its contention that Con-
gress intended to create such an equitable scheme:
In Award Service, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs met the
first Cort v. Ash factor, because section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) of ERISA-the
section that permits pension funds to return payments made under mis-
take of fact or law-was "clearly designed for the benefit of employ-
ers." It found that the second and third factors were met, reasoning
that Congress must have intended to create a private right of action
because otherwise the decision whether to refund the overpayments
would be left wholly to the trustee of the fund, who would naturally
favor keeping money in the fund. The court stated that "implying a
private right of action furthers the congressional scheme of permitting
restitution of contributions paid by mistake when equitable factors mili-
tate in favor of such restitution." The court found that the fourth fac-
tor was met because "no principle of federal-state comity renders a
federal cause of action inappropriate."
Id. at 1055-56 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 1055. To support its contention that the Sixth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits had rejected such an implied cause of action, the court cited Whitworth
Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1007 (1986) and Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 398-99 (11th
Cir.). The court also cited a district court case as supporting this proposition.
Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1055 (citing Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension
Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.
1983)). The court was careful to note that the affirmance of Crown Cork was of
no precedential value because its affirmance was without opinion. Id. at 1055
n.4.
39. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 399 and Whit-
worth, 794 F.2d at 232-33).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Crown Cork, 549 F. Supp. at 311). In Crown Cork, the court
analyzed this permissive language as part of the second Cort v. Ash factor,
whether Congress indicated its intent to create such a remedy. Crown Cork, 549
F. Supp. at 311. In Crown Cork, the court emphasized that this permissive lan-
guage did not manifest Congress' intent to create a right to such contributions.
Id.
42. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988). For the full text of section 502, see supra note
806 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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tary of Labor have the right to bring specified civil actions under
ERISA.4
4
After rejecting an implied cause of action, the court addressed to
the issue of whether an employer has a federal common law cause of
action for recovery of mistaken contributions. 45 Quoting a Third Cir-
cuit district court opinion, the court inferred that it is not inconsistent to
reject an implied cause of action yet approve a federal common law
cause of action because the finding of insufficient congressional intent to
imply a cause of action is not the equivalent of congressional intent to
deny a federal common law cause of action. 46 Moreover, unlike an im-
plied cause of action, specific congressional intent to create a cause of
action is not required for the court to create a federal common law cause
of action since Congress both authorized and expected federal courts to
create common law under ERISA.4 7 Therefore, instead of a finding of
specific congressional intent, the test to determine whether it is appro-
priate to create a federal common law cause of action is whether such
action is " 'necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the
statutory pattern enacted ... by Congress.' "48
Next, the court noted that the Third Circuit had previously recog-
nized several common law actions pursuant to ERISA.4 9 The court,
however, cautioned that " 'courts [should] not lightly create additional
44. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court quoted ChiefJudge Schwartz who observed: "'[T]he re-
sult of the Cort v. Ash analysis ... [is] not that Congress intended to forbid this
cause of action, but only that there is insufficient evidence that Congress in-
tended to provide a remedy.' " Id. (quoting Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 951 (D. Del. 1985), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988)).
47. Id. The court noted that in certain areas, such as ERISA, Congress has
authorized federal courts to create common law. Id. (citing Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) ("It is not uncommon for
the federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.")
and Van Orman v. American Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Con-
gress intended federal courts to fashion federal common law concerning pen-
sion plans under ERISA.")).
48. Id. (quoting Van Orman, 680 F.2d at 312). The court later interpreted
this test as also requiring that the federal common law cause of action furthers
the purposes of ERISA. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
49. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056. The Third Circuit has recognized a federal
common law claim by an employer alleging that a fund had fraudulently induced
the employer to withdraw from the fund, resulting in the imposition of a large
withdrawal penalty against the employer. Id. (citing Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc.
v. West Pa. Teamsters & Employers Pension Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 122 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 865 (1989)). A federal common law cause of action
for employees to recover from their employer the difference between pension
payments guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and those
promised in the pension agreement has also been recognized. Id. (citing Mur-
phy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237-39 (3d Cir. 1980)). An action for one
fund to sue another for a declaratory judgment as to which fund is liable for
medical expenses of a beneficiary of both plans has also been recognized. Id.
9
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[ERISA] rights under the rubric of federal common law' " because,
through ERISA, Congress established an extensive regulatory net-
work.50 The court next noted that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits were
divided on the issue, indicating that the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
cause of action for just such a reason.5 1 Specifically, the court noted the
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning that the comprehensive nature of remedies
within ERISA made it appropriate to presume that Congress deliber-
ately omitted the remedy and, therefore, denied the federal common law
cause of action. 52 The court then addressed the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing.53 While the court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's creation of a fed-
eral common law right, it rejected the Sixth Circuit's rationale because
that court failed to address what the Third Circuit determined to be the
primary consideration in the creation of a federal common law cause of
action-whether the creation of the cause of action would further the
purposes of ERISA.54
The court then considered whether the creation of a federal com-
mon law cause of action would be consonant with the purposes of ER-
ISA. First, the court discussed whether such a cause of action could be
consistent with the primary purpose of ERISA-"to 'protect the integ-
rity of the pension funds for the benefit of employees and their benefi-
ciaries.' "5 While admitting that an automatic right of restitution
(citing Northeast Dep't of ILGWU v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229, 764 F.2d
147, 157-59 (3d Cir. 1985)).
The court also cited Van Orman, as one situation where the court had re-
fused to create a federal common law cause of action. Id. at 1075 (citing Van
Orman, 680 F.2d at 312). In Van Orman, however, the court appeared to refuse
the creation of such a cause of action for employees to recover surplusage in an
on-going pension fund, not because such a cause of action was inconsistent with
policies underlying ERISA, but because the contracts involved specifically pro-
vided that the surplus was not to go to the employees. See Van Orman, 680 F.2d
at 312.
50. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Van Orman, 680 F.2d at 312).
51. Id. at 1057. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a federal common law cause
of action for employers to recover mistaken overpayments. Dime Coal Co. v.
Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 399 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1986). That court emphasized, how-
ever, that the issue of a federal common law cause of action was not well
presented. Id. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit found such a cause of action. Whit-
worth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 235-36 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986).
52. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1057 (citing Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 399 n.7). This
facile reasoning, however, although not addressed by the court, may lead to the
conclusion that no federal common law cause of action is ever to be created
under ERISA. For a discussion of this concept, see infra notes 106-10 and ac-
companying text.
53. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1057 (discussing Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 233-36).
54. Id. (citing Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 233-36).
55. Id. (quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F.
Supp. 307, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983)).
This purpose is outlined in the preamble to ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1988).
808 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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whenever error was established would conflict with this primary pur-
pose,5 6 the court argued that an approach which applies equitable con-
siderations to the allowance of restitution would be entirely consonant
with this primary purpose.5 7 In fact, the principal equitable considera-
tion in such an approach is whether restitution would undermine the
financial stability of the plan.5 8 The court further supported this asser-
tion by noting that most courts that have allowed such a cause of action
have followed this approach. 59
Next, the court addressed a subsidiary purpose of ERISA-encour-
aging the growth and maintenance of multiemployer plans.60 The court
found that the creation of such a federal common law cause of action
would further this purpose. 6 1 Since it is optional for an employer to
establish an ERISA plan, putting the burden of mistaken payments
wholly on employers may discourage some employers from operating
ERISA plans. 6 2 The creation of a federal common law cause of action
allowing the employer to recover these mistaken payments would there-
fore further the purpose of encouraging the growth and maintenance of
ERISA plans. 63
The primary reason, therefore, for the court's adoption of the fed-
56. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1057. Such an automatic right of action could
conflict with this purpose because " '[m]istaken contributions, once invested,
may be just as essential to the funds' integrity and stability as non-mistaken con-
tributions .... ' " Id. (quoting Crown Cork, 549 F. Supp. at 312).
57. Id. at 1057-58.
58. Id. at 1057 (citing Award Serv. Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Un-
ions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986) and
Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 719 F.2d 1063, 1066
(individuals who contribute to pension fund have causes of action for return of
mistaken contributions unless fund will be underfunded), modified on rehearing,
724 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1983)).
59. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1057. Many courts have only allowed restitution
where equities, including the integrity of the plan, are considered. See Award
Serv., 763 F.2d at 1069; Teamsters Local 639 v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d
865, 868 (4th Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit has also recognized that equitable
principles must be applied when it creates other similar federal common law
causes of action. See Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. West Pa. Teamsters & Em-
ployers Pension Fund, 847 F.2d 113, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing equita-
ble action by employer to avoid allegedly fraudulent assessment of liability for
withdrawal from multiemployer plan), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 865 (1989); Reuther
v. Trustees of the Trucking Employees, 575 F.2d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1978)
("Because Congress has emphasized 'the equitable character' of [ERISA-qualify-
ing] pension plans .... we believe that equitable principles should be applied in
this case.").
60. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1058. The court noted that Congress had in-
cluded provisions, such as tax benefits to employers who maintain ERISA-quali-
fying plans, to further the purpose of encouraging broad participation. Id.
Various legal commentaries also identify this as an underlying purpose of ER-
ISA. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 408.
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eral common law cause of action for equitable restitution is that "creat-
ing such a cause of action will fill in the interstices of ERISA and further
the purposes of ERISA." 6 4 Although this appears to be the primary rea-
son,6 5 the court also noted two subsidiary reasons.6 6 First, the existence
of section 403 does not demonstrate that Congress intended to deny
employers a cause of action for equitable restitution; instead it simply
shows that Congress agreed that employee benefit funds should be al-
lowed to return such contributions. 67 Second, the court stated that the
failure to recognize such a cause of action would lead to severely inequi-
table results not intended by Congress. 68
Because the court held that an employer has a federal common law
cause of action for the return of mistakenly paid contributions as long as
equitable considerations support such restitution, the court vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded for a consideration of the
equities of ordering restitution. 69 The court directed the lower court to
consider on remand the amount of money in the fund and the magni-
tude of the burden should the fund return the mistaken contribution. 70
Also relevant to the equities of ordering restitution is the question of
whether the contributions on behalf of Plucinski were truly made by mis-
take or whether such contributions constituted an attempt to defraud
the Fund into accepting Plucinski as a participant. 7'
III. ANALYSIS
In Plucinki, the Third Circuit correctly rejected an implied cause of
action under ERISA section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) for the employer to recover
mistaken contributions. 72 Although the court's rationale underlying its
64. Id.
65. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1058.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court stated:
A simple keypunch error could cost an employer tens of thousands of
dollars or more. Perhaps more strikingly, a trustee could extort extra
money from an employer by force or fraud, and the employer would
have no definite means of recouping the "contributions" from the
fund. Even in the more run of the mill case it would be inequitable to
allow the fund to keep money which came its way by honest mistake, for
example if the employer miscalculated the amount it owed or if it erro-





71. Id. For a discussion of the parties' respective positions on this issue, see
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
72. See Plucinski, 875 F.2d 1056. In Plucinski, the court rejected the implied
cause of action based on two determinations. Id. First, the court found that the
language of ERISA section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is merely permissive. Id. For the full
text of section 403, see supra note 3. Second, the court noted that neither legis-
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rejection of such an implied cause of action is brief, it is in accord with
the recent application of the Cort v. Ash 73 test by the Supreme Court and
lower courts.7 4 These Supreme Court decisions, as well as the lower
court decisions, have emphasized the importance of the first two fac-
tors.75 The first factor-whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"-has been interpreted as
not simply asking who would benefit from the act, but whether Congress
intended to confer federal rights on the plaintiff.7 6 This determination
can be based on the language of the statutes. 7 7 Thus, the determination
in Plucinski that the language of section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii) is merely permis-
sive 78 implies that this factor is not satisfied. 79
lative history nor section 502, which fails to specify employers within the list of
those that may maintain a civil action, suggest that Congress had any intent to
give employers causes of action under ERISA. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056. For
the full text of section 502, see supra note 9. For a summary of the court's dis-
cussion of the implied right of action, see supra notes 35-44 and accompanying
text.
73. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
74. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985) ("[b]ecause 'neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a con-
gressional intent to create a private right of action ... we need not carry the Cort
v. Ash inquiry further.' ") (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Work-
ers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 94 n.31 (1981)); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287, 293, 298 (1981) ("Cases subsequent to Cort have explained that
the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of ac-
tion ... but the four factors specified in Cort remain the 'criteria through which
this intent could be discerned.' "); Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 (ultimate
question is congressional intent and four Cort factors relevant to intent). For a
summary of the four factor test as originally set forth in Cort, see supra note 35.
75. See supra note 74; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., Burger,
C.J., Stewart, J., & Powell, J., concurring) (four factors for determining existence
of implied cause of action not all of equal weight).
76. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78-80 (statute making political contributions by corpo-
rations criminal suggests no intent on part of Congress to confer a federal right
upon shareholders against corporations where intent to protect shareholders
was at best a subsidiary purpose); see also Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294 (question
not who would benefit from eventual application of statute, rather whether Con-
gress intended to confer federal rights; discerned from language of statute).
Such a right appears to be created if either the statute was enacted specifi-
cally to benefit the plaintiff or if the language is right-creating. Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 (1979) (to determine first factor in Cort
analysis, court emphasized importance of whether right or duty creating lan-
guage was explicit and whether statute explicitly identified class to benefit); see
also Cort, 422 U.S. at 78-79 (suggesting right would be created if statute created
specifically to benefit plaintiff); Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294 (congressional intent
to create right may be discerned from language of statute).
77. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297-98; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690.
78. Plucinski, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056.
79. Similarly, in Crown Cork & Seal v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F.
Supp. 307, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court found that the first factor was not met
because the language was merely permissive. Id. at 311 (section 403(c)(2)(A)(ii)
not intended to create right to contributions, based on permissive language).
Other courts have stressed that section 403 creates no such right in an em-
1990]
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The second factor-whether Congress has indicated, either explic-
itly or implicitly, an intent to create such a remedy8°-is implied by the
court's second finding that there is no indication in either the statute or
the legislative history that Congress intended to give employers any
causes of action at all under ERISA.8 t The Plucinski court supported this
assertion by noting that section 502 of ERISA, which specifies all parties
that may bring civil actions under ERISA, does not mention employ-
ers.8 2 This rationale in Plucinski is clearly supported by a recent
Supreme Court case, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell.83
In Russell, a beneficiary brought an action against the plan for im-
proper refusal to pay benefits, seeking extra-contractual damages pursu-
ant to section 409(a) of ERISA.8 4 Although the Court found that the
first and fourth Cort factors were clearly met,8 5 the Court found that the
"six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)
of the statute ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend
to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate ex-
pressly."'8 6 As in Plucinski, the Supreme Court in Russell also found that
ployer because employers were not the primary beneficiaries under ERISA. See,
e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 233 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). For an analysis of whether the statute created
a right, see supra note 76.
80. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
81. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056. Other courts have noted the lack of legisla-
tive history concerning whether employers have such a cause of action. See, e.g.,
Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 227.
82. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1056.
83. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
84. Section 409(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any
of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries
by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan
any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to
such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,
including removal of such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988).
85. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (the beneficiary "is a member of the class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted and, in view of the pre-emptive effect of
ERISA, there is no state-law impediment to implying a remedy"). For a listing
of the Cort factors, see supra note 35.
86. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court
continued: "The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially sus-
pect upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interde-
pendent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a 'comprehensive and
reticulated statute.' " Id. (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 446 U.S. 358, 361 (1980)). Interpreting this case, the Sixth Circuit
stated: "The Court found ... that Congress did not intend to authorize reme-
dies other than those specifically listed in section 502." Whitworth Bros. Stor-
age Co. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007
(1986).
812 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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there was a "stark absence" in the legislative history of any reference to
an intention to authorize the remedy in question and concluded that the
second factor was not satisfied.8 7
The Third Circuit's conclusion that the application of the Cort fac-
tors did not warrant implication of an employer civil cause of action is
amply supported by the decisions of lower courts that have addressed
the issue of whether an employer had an implied cause of action under
section 403. Similar to the Plucinski court, these decisions, in denying an
implied cause of action, have emphasized both the lack of right-creating
language in the statute and the lack of legislative intent as evidenced
both by the legislative history and section 502.88 Therefore, in Plucinski,
the court's findings of a lack of legislative history and the section 502
exclusion of employers as those entitled to sue, clearly support a deter-
mination that the second Cort factor is not satisfied. For example, in
Crown Cork & Seal v. Teamsters Pension Fund,89 the employer, Crown Cork,
brought an action against the pension fund for the return of mistaken
contributions amounting to approximately $80,000.90 After concluding
that ERISA clearly provided no express cause of action, the court turned
to the determination of whether an implied cause of action existed
under section 403. 9 1 The court noted that the central inquiry is whether
Congress intended to create such a cause of action and that the Cort
87. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148. The Supreme Court also found that the struc-
ture of section 502 implies that the creation of any new remedy would violate the
third factor, consistency with the legislative scheme, because of section 502's
comprehensive "interlocking, interrelated and interdependent remedial
scheme." Id. at 145-46. The Court held that because these second and third
factors were not met, although the first and fourth were, no cause of action
could be implied under ERISA. Id. at 145-48.
Because of the Court's admission that the first and fourth factors were
clearly not met, this case has far-reaching impact. In effect, no civil causes of
action may be implied under ERISA because of section 502's comprehensive
and interlocking nature, and because the second and third factors are never met
unless there is some clear intent on the part of Congress evident in the legisla-
tive history or on the face of the statute to create such a cause of action. See
Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-48. This analysis, applied to Plucinski, suggests that there
is no implied cause of action under section 403.
Other courts, in rejecting an implied cause of action, have retained a more
rigid factor approach. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Wel-
fare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Del. 1985) (neither language
nor legislative history suggests section 403 created for "especial" benefit of em-
ployers; omission of employers from section 502 is strong indication that Con-
gress did not intend to grant employers cause of action; statutory scheme
primarily concerned with fiscal health of pension funds and ERISA preempts
state law), rev'd in part on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988).
88. See Crown Cork & Seal v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307,
310-12 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Dime Coal Co. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 398-99
(I Ith Cir. 1986).
89. 549 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
90. Id. at 308.
91. Id. at 310.
1990]
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factors are a means of discerning that intent.9 2 In refusing to find such
an implied cause of action, the court emphasized that the language of
section 403 was merely permissive and that employers were not in the
group for whose especial benefit the statutory scheme was enacted.93
The court also noted the lack of legislative history indicating intent and
the omission of employers from the list of those entitled to sue under
section 502. 9
4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Dime Coal Co. v. Combs,9 5 rejected a
strict factor analysis and supported its conclusion that there was no im-
plied cause of action for employers to recover mistaken payments by
noting that the language of the statute, the legislative history and the
"six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)"
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to create such a
cause of action for employers. 96 Thus, it appears that Plucinski correctly
rejected an implied cause of action.
The next question that must be addressed is whether it is inherently
inconsistent to deny an implied cause of action after concluding that
Congress did not intend to create such a cause of action, yet create the
same cause of action under the rubric of federal common law.9 7 In re-
jecting such a federal common law cause of action, the court in Dime Coal
suggests there exists such an inconsistency. It is submitted, however,
that it is entirely proper to create such a cause of action under federal
common law where Congress clearly indicates its intent that the courts
develop a federal common law to fill in the interstices of the statute it
creates.
92. Id. at 311. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979)). The court thereafter followed an analysis similar to that in Plucinski
without emphasizing a factor by factor approach. Id. For a discussion of the
recent rejection of a strict conception of the Cort test which emphasizes each
factor, see supra note 74.
93. Crown Cork, 549 F. Supp. at 311. The court noted that ERISA and the
MPPAA amendments were designed specifically to benefit employees and their
beneficiaries. Id. Although the court in Crown Cork did not follow a strict factor
approach, this finding roughly comports with the first Cort factor, namely,
whether the statute creates a right in the employer.
94. Although the court in Crown Cork did not follow a strict factor approach,
the lack of legislative history and the omission of employers from section 502
roughly comport with the second Cort factor-intent. In Crown Cork, the court
did not address the issue of whether there was a federal common law cause of
action and denied relief to the employee. Crown Cork, 549 F. Supp. at 311-12.
95. 796 F.2d 394 (11 th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. at 398 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 146 (1985)). In Dime Coal, the court also considered whether a federal com-
mon law cause of action was appropriate and rejected such a cause of action. Id.
at 399 n.7. For a discussion of the Dime Coal court's rejection of a federal com-
mon law cause of action, see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
97. This inherent inconsistency seems to be magnified when one considers
whether an implied cause of action is found, or whether the cause of action is
created under federal common law, the result will generally be the same. For a
discussion of this result, see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
814 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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In Dime Coal, the Eleventh Circuit declined to find a federal common
law action for equitable restitution, reasoning that the comprehensive
nature of the remedies within section 502 made it appropriate to pre-
sume that the remedy was deliberately omitted.98 In so doing, the Elev-
enth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union.99 It is submitted that this is a misapplication of Northwest
Airlines.
In Northwest Airlines, an airline carrier had been held liable to female
cabin attendants for back pay because the collectively bargained lower
wages of women attendants were found to violate both the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.100 The air
carrier then brought an action for contribution against the unions who
participated in the bargaining agreements.' 10 After determining that
the employer had no implied right of contribution under either stat-
ute, ' 0 2 the Court turned to the question of whether the employer had a
federal common law right to contribution.10 3 First, the Court noted that
generally, federal law-making power is vested within the legislative, not
the judicial, branch except for certain defined areas of the law such as
admiralty, where federal courts are granted general jurisdiction, and la-
bor management, where Congress has specifically authorized the judici-
ary to develop a federal common law under section 301 (a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).10 4 The Court then noted that the
liability for such discrimination against female cabin attendants did not
fit within these limited categories, instead it was "entirely a creature of
federal statute."' 0 5 In rejecting a federal common law cause of action,
the Court reasoned that where Congress has enacted a comprehensive
98. Dime Coal, 796 F.2d at 399 n.7 (" 'the presumption that a remedy was
deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures
for enforcement' ") (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)).
99. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
100. Id. at 81; see also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-z (1988).
101. Id. at 82.
102. Id. at 91-95.
103. Id. at 95-99.
104. Id. at 95-96 & n.35; see also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hart-
ley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), 301(a) (1988). In discussing the exception where
Congress has authorized creation of common law the court stated, "An analo-
gous situation is presented under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, we concluded that
§ 301(a) supplied a basis for federal jurisdiction over certain cases and an au-
thorization for judicial development of substantive federal law to govern those
cases." Id. at 96 n.35. (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 97. The Court then emphasized that "the authority to construe a
statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule . .. "
Id. In this area, where courts generally have little power to create common law,
the Court applied a rule of construction. Id.
1990] 815
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legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for en-
forcement, as it has done in both statutes in question, a presumption
applies that a remedy was deliberately omitted and the judiciary must
not fashion new remedies. 10 6 The Court, in concluding, was careful to
stress that this rationale did not apply in other situations where the
courts have more flexibility in creating common law. 10 7
While it is true that ERISA is just such a "comprehensive legislative
scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforce-
ment,"10 8 the presumption applied in Northwest Airlines cannot be ap-
plied to the creation of federal common law under ERISA because
ERISA, in fact, falls within the exception to the general prohibition
against the judicial creation of such law.' 0 9 Indeed, the power of the
courts to create federal common law under ERISA has been analogized
to that under section 301 of the LMRA which the Court in Northwest
Airlines specifically excepted from its holding."10 The application of
such a test to a comprehensive and integrated statute such as ERISA
would always result in a finding of inability to create federal common
law, a result directly contrary to the congressional mandate. I"'
Thus, while it may be inconsistent to deny an implied cause of ac-
tion yet allow a federal common law cause of action where there is no
106. Id.
107. Id. at 98. The court stated, "Whatever may be a federal court's power to
fashion remedies in other areas of the law, we are satisfied that it would be improper
for us to add a right to contribution to the statutory rights that Congress created
in the Equal Pay Act and Title VII." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 97.
109. ERISA's broad preemption provision, section 1449(a), and relevant
legislative history combine to indicate federal common law should be created
under ERISA. See Whitworth Bros. v. Central States, 794 F.2d 221, 234-35 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Note, supra note 1, at 406.
Many courts have noted the power of the federal judiciary to create a federal
common law under ERISA. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (legislative history demonstrates
Congress's intent that courts develop "appropriate equitable relief" under ER-
ISA); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24
n.26 (1983) ("a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and
pension plans..."); Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 234-35 (Congress intended courts to
develop federal common law under ERISA); Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635
F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1980) ("In enacting ERISA, Congress authorized the
evolution of a federal common law of pension plans."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142
(1982). For a discussion of the legislative history underlying the conclusion that
federal common law should be created under ERISA, see Note, supra note 1, at
406-07.
110. Russell, 473 U.S. at 156 (citing remarks of senators showing treatment
under ERISA should be similar to that under section 301 of Labor Management
Relations Act).
111. Id. at 157 ("Thus ERISA was not so 'carefully integrated' and 'crafted'
as to preclude further judicial delineation of appropriate rights and remedies;
far from barring such a process, the statute explicitly directs that the courts shall
undertake it.").
816 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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congressional mandate to create federal common law, the creation of
federal common law is of necessity required where Congress has so
mandated it. Such a creation of federal common law is consistent with
congressional intent because the test for determining whether a federal
common law cause of action is appropriate is broader than that required
to establish whether an implied cause of action exists. While specific
congressional intent to create such a remedy is required to imply a cause
of action,1 1 2 the test for the creation of a federal common law cause of
action is whether such a cause of action would further the purposes of
the underlying statute.1 1 3
The creation of a federal common law cause of action for equitable
restitution as limited by the Third Circuit in Plucinski clearly furthers the
purposes of ERISA. In Plucinski, the court was careful to allow a federal
common law cause of action only when equitable considerations, such as
the financial stability of an employee benefit plan, support the creation
of a remedy. 114 Such a cause of action is consistent with the policy of
ERISA, stated in the preamble to the statute, which seeks to insure the
equitable character and financial soundness of employee benefit
plans. 115 Moreover, such a cause of action furthers the policy of encour-
aging growth and maintenance of multi-employer plans. 1 6 If employ-
ers alone bare the burden of mistaken payments, they would be
discouraged from operating ERISA qualifying plans. Moreover, ER-
ISA's broad preemption provision 17 and the requirement of uniform-
ity"18 mandate the creation of a federal common law of equitable
112. Plucinski, 875 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1989). For a further discussion
of this intent requirement, see supra note 72-74 and accompanying text.
113. See Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1058; see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 158 (the test
is "whether allowance or disallowance of particular relief would best effectuate
the underlying purposes of ERISA.. ."); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441
F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("The source of this law must be the poli-
cies underlying ERISA."), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978); Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (under Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, test is whether remedy will effectuate policy of
legislation).
114. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1057-58. For a discussion of other applicable
equitable considerations suggested by the court, see supra notes 57-59 and ac-
companying text.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). For a discussion of the policies underly-
ing ERISA, see Note, supra note 1, at 398-99, 408-09.
116. Plucinski, 875 F.2d at 1058.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
118. ERISA sought to provide a uniform body of law applicable to em-
ployee benefit plans through its preemption of state law. Note, supra note 1, at
405 n.66 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4670 (state-
ment of Rep. Dent that preemption provision eliminates problems of conflicting
and inconsistent state and local law); 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF
1974, at 4770-71 (statement of Sen. Javits that interests of uniformity required
displacement of state law in field of employee benefit programs)).
8171990]
19
Fialkowski: Employee Benefits - Employee Retirement Income Security Act Allow
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
818 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 799
restitution rather than the random application of state equity law.
Although the court in Plucinski failed to address the issue of em-
ployer standing under ERISA, this issue must be addressed in light of
the court's acceptance of a federal common law cause of action because
the majority of circuit courts have summarily dismissed, for lack of
standing, civil causes of action arising under ERISA brought by employ-
ers. 119 Underlying this rejection of employer standing is the rationale
that section 502(a) exclusively lists those parties entitled to sue under
ERISA, thus excluding employers.' 2 0 It is submitted, however, that this
While state law may be used as a model, uniformity is required when courts
are called upon to create federal common law. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 157 n.18 (1985) ("Where the courts are required them-
selves to fashion a federal rule of decision, the source of the law must be federal
and uniform. Yet, state law, where compatible with national policy, may be re-
sorted to and adopted as a federal rule of decision .... ") (quoting Wayne
Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 325 (N.D. Ind.),
modified on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977)).
119. See International Union of Bricklayers v. Menard & Co., 619 F. Supp.
1457, 1461 (D.R.I. 1985) (clear majority of decisions have rejected standing to
those not enumerated in section 502(a)); Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 412
(7th Cir. 1989) (approach of Ninth Circuit which confers employer standing re-
jected by most other courts); see also Gruber v. Hubbard Bert Karle Weber, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (Ninth Circuit case only judicial authority
court could find to support employer standing).
The lead case supporting the position that employers have standing to
bring a civil action under ERISA is Fentron Industries v. National Shopmen Pension
Fund. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982). In Fentron, an employer sued the pension
fund and its trustees for violation of their fiduciary duties in withholding bene-
fits. Id. at 1303. The employer alleged injury from interference with its collec-
tive bargaining agreement and disruption of employer-employee relations
caused by the trustee's actions. Id. at 1304. The court then developed a three
part test derived from Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
56 (1970): "in order to have standing [the] plaintiff must (1) suffer injury in fact;
(2) fall arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute allegedly
violated; and (3) show that the statute itself does not preclude the suit." Fentron,
674 F.2d at 1304. Applying the test, the court held that employers have stand-
ing under ERISA. Id. at 1305. Specifically, the court found that (1) the injuries
were sufficiently personal; (2) the injuries fell within the zone of interests of ER-
ISA-stability of employment and development of industrial relations; and
(3) the listing in section 502(a) cannot be considered exclusive because there is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest either that the list is exclusive or that
Congress intentionally omitted employers. Id. at 1304-05.
120. See, e.g., Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union, 717 F.2d 726,
730 (2d Cir. 1983) (employers have no standing to sue under ERISA for viola-
tion of fiduciary duties because section 502(a) is exclusive).
Most courts reject the rationale of Fentron on two grounds: (1) the listing in
section 502(a) is exclusive in light of the comprehensive nature of ERISA and
the lack of legislative history and (2) Fentron applied an inappropriate standard
in asking whether Congress intended to deny the suit, instead of the relevant
inquiry into whether Congress intended to grant the remedy. See Tuvia, 717
F.2d at 730 (applying rationale of Pressroom Unions v. Continental Assurance
Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1983) in which that court held that section
502(e) was an exclusive jurisdictional grant of standing); see also Grand Union
Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
20
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rationale does not apply to a federal common law cause of action
although such a cause of action "arises under" ERISA, to the extent that
the judiciary is fulfilling its congressional mandate to fill in the intersti-
ces of ERISA.12 1
In Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States,122 the Sixth Circuit
suggested that this rationale is not applicable to the return of employer's
overpayments to employee benefit plans because the standing test is
clearly satisfied under a contractual analysis.1 2 3 The test for determin-
ing standing is whether the plaintiff has suffered "injury in fact." ' 24 The
court continued, "[I]t appears clear that an employer who mistakenly
pays contributions . . .which he is not contractually obligated to pay is
injured in fact by the trust fund's refusal to return the contributions,
and, therefore satisfies the requirements of the standing doctrine."i 2
5
Moreover, the rationale underlying the rejection of employer stand-
ing, specifically the exclusive nature of section 502(a), cannot apply
when a federal common law cause of action is at issue.i 26 This rationale
cannot apply because a federal common law cause of action is created to
(employer has no standing to bring suit for declaration as to its obligation to pay
withdrawal liability); Hermann Hosp. v. Meba Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d
1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1988) (hospital had no standing to bring action against plan
as nonenumerated party in section 502(a) but would have derivative standing as
assignee of beneficiary); Menard & Co., 619 F. Supp. at 1460-62 (as nonenumer-
ated party, plan has no standing to sue employer and related corporation when
seeking contributions); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Bell, 596 F. Supp. 1053,
1058 (D. Kan. 1984) (employer has no standing under ERISA to determine
whether Kansas's laws are preempted by ERISA); cf Gruber, 608 F. Supp. at 393-
94 (employers who brought suit against fund had no standing under ERISA but
court allowed suit under pendent jurisdiction).
For a discussion of Fentron, see supra note 118. For the text of section
502(a), see supra note 9.
121. For a discussion of this congressional mandate, see supra notes 106-10
and accompanying text.
122. 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). In Whit-
worth, the court denied an implied cause of action for the return of mistaken
contributions but allowed a federal common law cause of action. Id. at 233-36.
123. Id. at 226 n.7.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added). This rationale is further supported when one
considers that in most other suits where the employer was denied standing, the
employer was suing the trustees of the plan for a breach of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union, 717 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir.
1983). This injury is much less personal, especially when one considers that,
under ERISA section 404, "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries ...." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (1988).
126. This rationale of the exclusive nature of section 502(a) has been ap-
plied in situations where the plaintiff-employer argues that an implied cause of
action exists under ERISA when no express cause of action exists. See, e.g.,
Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1989). This is further evidenced
by courts naming this standing argument on the part of the employer the "im-
plied statutory standing concept." Hermann Hosp. v. Meba Medical & Benefits
Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1988).
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fill the gaps of ERISA, so that by necessary implication, it is outside the
scope of section 502(a). In creating a federal common law cause of ac-
tion, the courts create a right in the employer, supplemental to ERISA,
to recover mistaken contributions. Therefore, when such contributions
are not returned, the employer's judicially-created right is violated and
the employer meets the standing requirement of injury in fact.12 7 Thus,
not only is the court's creation of a federal common law cause of action
valid, but there should be no impediments to an employer invoking such
a cause of action.
IV. CONCLUSION
In creating the federal common law cause of action for equitable
restitution, the court in Plucinski achieved a result that is both fair to all
parties concerned and supported by well reasoned precedent and the
legislative history of ERISA. The employer can now get back what is
truly his as long as the equities favor such a return. If, for example, the
return of mistaken contributions would undermine the integrity of the
fund, the employer would not be entitled to a refund. 128 This result is
consistent with the tension between the fairness of returning something
that is rightfully the employer's, and the overriding policy underlying
ERISA 129 of protecting the interests of plan participants and benefi-
ciaries, coupled with the fact that the employer who makes these contri-
butions is truly in the best position to avoid such a mistake.
Although the end result of creating an equitable cause of action is
essentially the same as that arrived at by most circuits that allow an im-
plied cause of action by applying equitable considerations to the deter-
mination of whether the payment should be returned,' 3 0 such an
127. See Whitworth, 794 F.2d at 226 n.7 (standing requirement is satisfied
when plaintiff demonstrates "injury in fact"); see also, Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Bell, 596 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Kan. 1984) (under general principles of stand-
ing to sue, "actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendants" is necessary; plaintiff must have personal stake in the outcome of
the litigation) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
128. Plucinski, 875 F.2d 1052, 1057-58 (court should deny recovery if resti-
tution would underfund plan). In Plucinski, the court also noted that other equi-
table considerations would include fraud on the part of the fund to extort extra
payments not actually due, as well as fraud on the part of the employer to lead
the fund to accept a participant not actually covered by the collective bargaining
agreements. Id. at 1058.
This approach resolves the concern of many courts that such a cause of
action would undermine the integrity of the fund, leading those courts to deny
such a cause of action. For a discussion of this concern and those courts that
have rejected the cause of action on such a basis, see supra note 15 and accompa-
nying text.
129. For a discussion of the underlying policies of ERISA, see supra notes
113-15 and accompanying text.
130. Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618
F. Supp. 943, 950 (D. Del. 1985) (creation of federal common law cause of ac-
tion for equitable restitution essentially consistent with courts that have found
820 [Vol. 35: p. 799
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implied cause of action is not supported by the necessary underlying
legislative intent required to imply a cause of action under ERISA. 13 , In
contrast, all that is required to create a federal common law cause of
action is the congressional authorization that the courts fill in the gaps
of the relevant statute and that the cause of action further the policies
underlying the statute.13 2 As outlined in Plucinski, these requirements
are clearly satisfied.
Elise A. Fialkowski
an implied cause of action because those courts apply equitable considerations),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts that have
found an implied cause of action generally apply equitable considerations. See
Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Unions, 763 F.2d 1066, 1068-69
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); Teamsters Local 639-Employ-
ers Health Trust v. Cassidy Trucking, Inc., 646 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1981).
131. For a discussion of the congressional intent necessary to imply a cause
of action, see supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of the test required to create a federal common law
cause of action, see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
1990]
23
Fialkowski: Employee Benefits - Employee Retirement Income Security Act Allow
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
